University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Rhetoric and Communication Studies Faculty
Publications

Rhetoric and Communication Studies

2012

Standing By: Police Paralysis, Race, and the 1964
Philadelphia Riot
Nicole Maurantonio
University of Richmond, nmaurant@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/rhetoric-faculty-publications
Part of the Rhetoric Commons
Recommended Citation
Maurantonio, Nicole. "Standing By: Police Paralysis, Race, and the 1964 Philadelphia Riot." Journalism History 38, no. 2 (2012):
110-121.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Rhetoric and Communication Studies at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Rhetoric and Communication Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

NICOLE MAURANTONIO

Standing By

Police Paralysis, Race, and the 1964 Philadelphia Riot
Although considerable scholarship has explored the riots of the 1960s as the culmination of tensions simmering throughout
the tumultuous decade, this article examines Philadelphia’s 1964 riot and the ways that local newspapers attempted to
frame the violence. By urging Philadelphians to view the riot as the outcome of an ineffectual police department, which
was ill-equipped to confront black “hoodlums,” journalists privileged frames of police paralysis and marginalization. The
circulation of these two frames alone, however, cannot explain the eventual demise of the city’s Police Advisory Board. This
study argues that the imagery of police standing idly by while the streets of Philadelphia dissolved into chaos proved invaluable ammunition for opponents of the Board, who found in the news coverage further evidence of postwar liberalism’s
failure to protect the populace.

O

n the evening of Friday, August 28, 1964, Philadelphia
succumbed to the wave of urban riots that had been
sweeping cities along the East Coast during a long and
hot summer.1 Violence broke out at the corner of 22nd Street and
Columbia Avenue in North Philadelphia after a black couple,
Rush and Odessa Bradford, was confronted by two Philadelphia
police officers, Patrolmen John Hoff and Robert Wells. Hoff, who
was white, and Wells, who was black, had been called to the scene
because the couple, allegedly engaged in a domestic dispute in their
car, was blocking the flow of traffic at the busy intersection.2 Upon
reaching the corner, the officers found Odessa Bradford holding her
foot on the car’s brake pedal. She proceeded to argue with Officer
Wells, who pulled her out of the car by her wrists. Her removal
should have been the end of the relatively minor disturbance, but
as she was being put into the police wagon, a bystander emerged
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from the crowd and punched Hoff, causing passersby to enter
the fray. After arresting Bradford and the bystander, who had
punched his partner, Wells returned to the scene of the Bradfords’
dispute to find a storm of flying bottles and bricks being aimed at
police and their wagons. The ensuing violence and looting lasted
the remainder of the weekend as rumors spread throughout the
neighborhood that a black woman had been beaten and killed by a
white police officer. Despite the rumors being untrue, they stirred
greater anger toward police. When the violence finally ended, two
were dead, 350 were wounded, and commercial establishments
lining the Columbia Avenue thoroughfare suffered approximately
$4 million of damage.3
Home to the highest unemployment rates in the city, poorest
housing, and lowest income and educational levels, North
Philadelphia was more than simply an early example of the
explosiveness of the urban crisis within the existing narrative of the
1960s.4 Commonly referred to as “the Jungle,” the predominantly
African-American neighborhood was the site of 19 percent of
the city’s crime and only 9 percent of its population. The phrase
“the Jungle” was used by “many policemen, . . . much of the
white community, [and] even . . . some juveniles who live in the
area,” according to the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin. Such usage
signaled that in addition to being “a catalogue of social failure,”5
as the Bulletin reported, North Philadelphia also was discursively
constructed in highly racialized, and racist, terms. The lexicon of
Journalism History 38:2 (Summer 2012)

A Columbia Avenue storefront in Philadelphia shows the result of a 1964 riot.
(Used with the permission of the Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Libraries, Philadelphia, Pa.)
descriptors conjured by a phrase such as “the Jungle” allowed for
the demonization of the neighborhood and those who lived there.
This casting of the neighborhood, set within the context of frequent
charges of police brutality by community members, made North
Philadelphia no stranger to strained relations with the Philadelphia
Police Department.6 Urban League Executive Director Andrew
Freeman dubbed North Philadelphia “a racial tinderbox” in early
August 1964, waiting for a spark to ignite it.7 Only weeks later, the
Bradfords’ chance altercation provided the spark.

R

iots such as those which broke out in Philadelphia in 1964,
in Watts in Los Angeles one year later, and in Newark and
Detroit in 1967 have been cited by historians as the catalysts
compelling federal attention to longstanding issues of racism and
inequality and resulting in President Lyndon Johnson forming
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner
Commission) in 1967. In its report a year later, the commission
devoted particular attention to two institutions: the police and the
news media, both of which were deemed to play formative roles
in “deepening the bitter residue of fear . . . threatening the future
of all Americans.”8 Although not among the cities investigated by
Journalism History 38:2 Summer 2012

the Kerner Commission, Philadelphia, as one of the earliest U.S.
cities to fall victim to violence in the 1960s, contributed to the
climate of turmoil simmering within the cities, which, by the end
of the decade, culminated in riots elsewhere even more devastating
in scale than its own.
This study positions journalists within the existing narrative of
the 1960s as historical agents, who shaped discourses surrounding
race, policing, and urban violence with unintended results. Through
a textual analysis of newspaper coverage of the 1964 Philadelphia
riot and historical manuscripts, this study contends that journalists
helped shape Philadelphia’s future course, specifically regarding to
whom its police would be beholden. As interpreters of the violence
that broke out on Columbia Avenue in 1964, journalists urged
readers to understand the riot in a particular way: as a war touched
off by deviant “hoodlums” whose blatant disregard for law and
order was in some ways enabled by an unprepared Philadelphia
Police Department. It is argued that the two dominant frames—
marginalization and police paralysis— embedded in the sources
examined interacted to provide the discursive fodder for opponents
of Philadelphia’s Police Advisory Board in an effort to dismantle
the body.
111

Through an examination of the nuances of news coverage advocates, signaled hope for Philadelphia’s future.
uniting, and in some instance differentiating, Philadelphia’s
Slightly over a year after the riot had ended in Philadelphia,
three dailies—the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, the Philadelphia George Herold, the chairman of the Commission on Christian
Inquirer, and the Philadelphia Daily News—as well as a black Social Concerns, sent a letter to Philadelphia Mayor James Tate in
newspaper, the two-day-a-week Philadelphia Tribune, this study which he warned, “Philadelphia is one of two major United States
suggests that deeper insight can be gained into the stakes involved cities with a civilian review board. Properly, the nation watches what
in coverage of the 1964 Columbia Avenue riot. In privileging happens here.”13 Although the debates surrounding the necessity of
the frames of marginalization and police paralysis, journalists the Police Advisory Board had a direct impact on Philadelphia,
opened up discursive possibilities even they had not envisioned, other cities, such as New York, were looking to Philadelphia’s
providing a language that could be co-opted by political interests. unfolding story as they debated the merits of their own police review
Thus, this case is one of unintended consequences: journalistic boards.14 However, by 1969, with the dissolution of Philadelphia’s
frames were used to contribute to the
Police Advisory Board, another symbolic
fortification of a conservative coalition
nail was driven into the coffin of postwar
“Slightly over a year after the
being strengthened by a burgeoning
liberalism. The discourse of fear, bolstered
sense among whites in urban areas that
by journalistic frames of marginalization
their security was threatened.9 Although riot had ended in Philadelphia, and police paralysis that were used to
the circulation of these two frames alone
cover Philadelphia’s 1964 riot, prevailed
George Herold, the chairman
cannot explain the eventual demise of
as the racial tensions that had provided
Philadelphia’s Police Advisory Board, this of the Commission on Christian much of the initial impetus for the board
study argues that the image of the police
continued to divide the city, much like
officer standing idly by while young black
Social Concerns, sent a letter to its postindustrial counterparts.
“hoodlums” roamed the streets proved
Philadelphia Mayor
invaluable ammunition for opponents of
he selection of the newspapers
the board, who found in news coverage
included in this analysis was
further evidence of liberalism’s failure to James Tate in which he warned,
rooted in an effort to explore
protect the populace.
the range of audiences to whom
‘Philadelphia is one of two
When the Police Advisory Board was
Philadelphia’s journalists spoke. The
founded in 1958 under the auspices of
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, the city’s
major United States cities
liberal Democratic Mayor Richardson
newspaper of record, was a family-owned
Dilworth, it was supposed to play a vital
paper started in 1847, whose slogan
with a civilian review board.
role in the rehabilitation of Philadelphia’s
famously read, “Nearly Everybody Reads
Properly, the nation watches
ailing police department, which was
the Bulletin.”15 One of the ten largest
beset by corruption and allegations of
newspapers in the United States in
what happens here.’”
police brutality. With the ousting of the
1960, it was the largest afternoon paper
Republican machine in 1952, which
in the English-speaking world. Run by
had ruled the city for more than sixty
the McLean family, which was known
years, Philadelphia became a city run by Cold War liberals who to have made clear to its staff its belief that good journalism was
sought to dissociate the mayor’s office from the police department, thorough, unsensational journalism,16 the Bulletin was known for
historic bedfellows. Part of the liberals’ plan was to act upon its superior local reporting in multiple daily editions.
the recommendations of organizations such as the Philadelphia
Unlike the Bulletin, which had a reputation in the city as a
Fellowship Commission, which sought to fight discrimination paper of repute, the Philadelphia Inquirer had been taken over by
and systemic injustices in schools, the workplace, and the media, Walter Annenberg upon his father’s death in 1942 and was known
among other sites, and to create an infrastructure which would as the mouthpiece of its publisher from the 1950s until he sold the
enable Philadelphia to fulfill its latent potential.10
newspaper in 1969. Historically the Inquirer tended toward the right
Responding to organizations such as the Americans for of the political spectrum although it deemed itself an “independent
Democratic Action, the ACLU, and the NAACP, Dilworth newspaper,”17 supporting Democratic candidates in the early 1950s.
intended for the board to listen to testimony from citizen Despite its self-proclaimed independence, the paper’s involvement in
complainants and accused policemen, making recommendations a variety of scandals during the first decades of Walter Annenberg’s
to the mayor ranging from discharge from the department to tenure as publisher damaged its reputation as a legitimate purveyor of
dismissal of the complaint. The board was a direct response to news. When asked about Annenberg’s influence, Bulletin journalist
those, like a city councilman, who believed police were pursuing Peter Binzen said in 1979, “I thought Annenburg [sic] was the most
“terror tactics” throughout the city.11 The intent of the board was reckless, irresponsible publisher in the United States when he was
that citizens could trust that their complaints would be heard by going full-speed ahead here.”18 Although Binzen was a journalist
the Police Advisory Board without having to worry that they would employed by the Inquirer’s most serious competitor, he was not
be blindly dismissed. Unlike the department’s internal board of alone in his critique of the way that the Inquirer was run.19 Over the
inquiry, which was often charged with “whitewash” and “collusion course of the 1960s, Annenberg made a friend in policeman-turned
between brother officers,”12 the Police Advisory Board would be Commissioner Frank Rizzo, a tough cop and a staunch law and
different. The mayor saw it as having particular potential in North order advocate. This relationship shaped the tenor of the Inquirer’s
Philadelphia, where relationships between the predominantly coverage, particularly coverage pertaining to the Philadelphia Police
black neighborhood and the predominantly white police force Department, throughout the 1960s. Although the Bulletin’s weekly
were especially tense. The board, for the mayor and the board’s circulation exceeded the Inquirer’s, the latter consistently dominated
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the Bulletin’s Sunday edition.20
utilized in different ways by them. Despite their collective
The city’s most prominent tabloid, the Philadelphia Daily agreement that the rioters were young “vandals” who were not part
News, was purchased in 1957 by Walter Annenberg, who made of the black mainstream, the papers diverged about whether the
it an afternoon publication. Despite the Inquirer’s and the Daily relatively laissez-faire police department had abdicated its role by
News’ shared publisher throughout the 1960s, the newspapers not enforcing order more assertively.
did not consistently share an editorial stance because Annenberg’s
Those participating in North Philadelphia’s weekend riot,
attention was devoted predominantly to the Inquirer. Known as according to local newspapers, were characterized not only as
the “people paper,” whose circulation rested on street sales rather “rioters” but “looters,” “hoodlums,” “vandals,” and even “urchins,”
than subscriptions, the Daily News embodied a form of personal a term used only by the Philadelphia Tribune. Taken together,
journalism largely absent from the Bulletin and Inquirer. Unlike these descriptors contributed to news organizations’ frame of
its counterparts, the Daily News was a highly visual newspaper, marginalization, which was reinforced by repeated dissociation
often printing page-long photographic
of the rioters with the civil rights
montages.
movement. As Police Commissioner
“The rioters participating
The Philadelphia Tribune, known
Howard Leary stated in an interview, the
as “the constructive newspaper” and
“hoodlums” who led the violence were
in North Philadelphia’s
later dubbed “the voice of the black
not the “responsible members of the
community,” was founded in 1884 by
Negro community,”24 who had welcomed
weekend
riot,
according
to
local
Christopher J. Perry and is the oldest
his men into the North Philadelphia
continually published African-American
neighborhood as they attempted to restore
newspapers,
were
characterized
newspaper in the United States. Founded
order. Described as “out of control,” “a
as an advocate for the black community,
shouting, laughing mob,” and “howling,”
not only as ‘rioters’ but
the Tribune not only covered “hard
the rioters’ behavior was not only deemed
news” in the traditional sense but also
‘looters,’ ‘hoodlums,’ ‘vandals,’ disrespectful and lacking in control
community and social events. As V.P.
but indicative of their youth; all three
and even ‘urchins,’ a term
Franklin argued in 1984, the Tribune
dailies described the rioters as between
served not only as a lens through
their teens and thirties.25 A September
used only by the Philadelphia
which to view the changing contours of
1 Tribune headline further advanced the
Philadelphia’s growing African-American
claim: “Youths ‘Sorry’ for Defacing
Tribune. Taken together, these dailies’
population but as an “educational
Tan Business: New Shoes From Looted
agency” that enhanced solidarity.21 The
Stores Are First for Urchin.”26 Although
descriptors contributed
newspaper was published on Tuesdays
the tone of the Tribune’s headline was
and Fridays throughout the 1960s.22
less disdainful than the city’s dailies, in
to news organizations’ frame
To examine how these four
choosing to reinforce the poverty of the
of marginalization, which
newspapers framed the story of the
neighborhood’s residents, the Tribune,
1964 Columbia Avenue riot, this study
like the dailies, contributed to the general
was reinforced by repeated
drew upon news articles, photographs,
sense that the rioters were simply young
editorials, letters to the editor, and
who were not to be taken seriously.
dissociation of the rioters with people
commentaries during the two weeks
By positioning the rioters as young
following the riot’s outbreak on August
people “acting out,” news organizations
the civil rights movement.”
28.23 In order to assess the ways in which
argued implicitly that these young
the papers’ coverage was deployed in
men and women were not exercising
discourse surrounding the viability
legitimate grievance. Only the Tribune
of Philadelphia’s Police Advisory Board, this study additionally unsurprisingly attempted to subtly convey an alternative reading
examined various pieces of correspondence, press releases, and of the rioters, referring to them once as “soldiers.”27 This analogy
pamphlets relating to debates regarding the board, from its granted them a degree of legitimacy absent in the dailies. As a part
inception in 1958 through its eventual demise in 1969.
of a collective devoted to fighting for a cause, a soldier is one behind
whom support is rallied. Thus, the use of the term suggested a
ews of the outbreak of violence on Columbia Avenue first degree of solidarity with the rioters, juxtaposing the imagery of
ran on August 29 in the Inquirer and was followed by the dispersed “hoodlums” ravaging the streets, which appeared more
afternoon editions of the Daily News and the Bulletin. consistently in news reports. The use of the term “urchin” had a
Due to the timing of the event, the first Tribune coverage of the similar effect, conjuring up images of helpless children. Although
riot did not appear until September 1 after the violence had ended. the reference to “urchins” did not afford the rioters a cause implied
Each newspaper devoted considerable column space to covering by the term “soldiers,” “urchin” suggested that the rioters could
and commenting on the violence. The sheer quantity of coverage not be held responsible for their actions because they were only
suggested the story’s significance, but patterns quickly emerged in children. Instead of instigators, they were victims of a political
the quality of coverage as journalists encouraged readers to interpret system that had contributed to their community’s poverty.
the riot in a particular way: a violent outburst begun by deviant
The Tribune, however, was careful not to grant the rioters too
“hoodlums” whose disregard for law and order was largely enabled much legitimacy. Articulating solidarity with the rioters would
by an unprepared Philadelphia Police Department. The two have simultaneously undermined local black leaders who vocally
dominant frames emerging from this reading—marginalization denounced the riot. One such leader, the Rev. Leon H. Sullivan,
and police paralysis—were present in all of the papers but were distanced the rioters from the local black community, stating:
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Philadelphia brought in large numbers of police officers, who were criticized for being too passive, for the 1964 riot.
(Used with the permission of the Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Libraries, Philadelphia, Pa.)
“The vast majority of the Negroes disapprove of the actions of a
comparatively few hoodlums.”28 His decision to position the rioters
as unrepresentative of the broader community, which was echoed
by other black leaders, signaled recognition of the riot’s potential
to undermine the efforts of civil rights leaders. For this reason,
the Tribune was in the tenuous position of having to toe the line
between the black community at large and the leaders in it.
The delicate space occupied by the Tribune was further
evidenced in the tension between the paper’s front-page headline
on September 1—“Respect for Law and Order Philadelphia’s Only
Salvation”—and its page five commentary—“Rioters, Hoodlums
Are What They Are Because America Made Them That Way.”
Thus, the paper lauded police on page one for not acting more
assertively and denounced those who disrupted the peace, and
then the page five commentary emphasized the neighborhood’s
structural problems, pointing to the daily injustices confronted
by community members. The paper’s focus on infrastructural
problems plaguing North Philadelphia demonstrated an acute
awareness of the African-American audience, which was comprised
114

of not only participants in the riot but also more established
civil rights activists. Although the Tribune’s systemic focus in its
commentary signaled a departure from news coverage, it defaulted
to its characterization of the rioters as “hoodlums,” which was in
accord with the local black leaders, who deemed the riot “Not Civil
Rights.”29 In defining the riot as against the civil rights movement,
a strategy which was used by all four newspapers, and the rioters,
by extension, drunken gangs of rowdy teens, race was removed
from newspaper discourse as a factor leading to the violence. This,
however, is not to say race was not part of the discourse on the
street.30 The frame of marginalization positioned the rioters as
fearsome youths who fit the pre-existing racialized “Jungle” motif.
Linked to the frame of marginalization was police paralysis,
which was evident in the first Inquirer report of the riot: “A squad
of nearly 100 policemen watched helplessly at 36th and Columbia
as scores of young men and women smashed a window, denuded
the display in seconds, then rushed inside to pillage and plunder.”31
The description of a helpless police department passively watching
rather than acting authoritatively was visible in a Bulletin headline
Journalism History 38:2 (Summer 2012)

later that day: “Police Stand By.” One day later, on August 30, the looting in North Philadelphia Negro section.” Two equally sized
Bulletin reiterated police inaction, announcing, “Daylight Gangs photographs under it were captioned: “Police keep passersby
Loot Stores as Police Watch.”32
moving in riot area, but plundering continued during Friday night
Although the Daily News’ language was not as explicit as either and was resumed after darkness fell Saturday night” and “Police
the Inquirer’s or the Bulletin’s in casting the department as passive, crouch behind car for cover as they are fired on by rioters during
the paper’s front page headline on August 29, “33 Policemen second night of violence. Officers returned fire.”37 The largest
Injured Battling Looting Gangs,” suggested a similar inability of photograph presented the damage in the neighborhood, where
the police to effectively complete their tasks.33 Despite the Daily residents and storeowners picked up the pieces of their homes and
News’ use of the term “battling,” which suggested greater activity shops in the wake of violence. While the two smaller photographs
and effort on the part of police, the headline ultimately aligned displayed police efforts to actively stop the riot, they depicted a
the newspaper with its daily counterparts by pointing to the police department that could do little to stop the “plundering.”
victimization of officers. Police injuries
Thus, they reinforced the sense that if
sustained at the hands of “looting gangs”
police were on the scene, they did little
served as the focal point of Daily News
to help. If officers were not pictured
“Except for [an] anomalous
headlines rather than the success of
hiding behind cars for cover, they
police in attempting to quell the riot.
were in formation or more informally
photograph of police action
Police officers were portrayed as victims
surrounded by fellow officers. Such
[in the Philadelphia Tribune], images only reinforced the messages of
rather than keepers of the peace, fighting
a losing battle.
the papers’ headlines and news articles of
photographs of police across the talk but no action.
Resembling the Daily News’ indirect
approach to addressing the nature of
city’s newspapers told the same
police action, the Tribune’s lead headline
hile the newspapers emphaon September 1 made no reference to
sized
the
department’s
visual story:
police, which was a pattern that persisted
generally passive approach
throughout the paper’s headlines. Its lead
to policing the riot in headlines
a police department that
headline read: “Trib Photog Gives Blowand photographs, the frames of
did little to intervene as the
by-Blow Account of Columbia Ave.
marginalization and police paralysis were
Rioting: Sees Looters Strike Stores Like
given further credence by public officials,
violence grew more intense.”
Soldiers.”34 Providing a detailed narrative
community activists, and police officers
of the violence, the Tribune article also
who, journalists reported, cited the
offered insight into the rioters, describing
police department’s lack of control over
a photojournalist’s exchange with a young man who offered to the unfolding violence in North Philadelphia. But despite their
break a store window so the journalist could “get a good shot.” agreement on the rioters’ marginal status and the department’s
The photographer’s interaction reminded readers that journalists, hands-off approach to handling them, these sources differed in
and in particular the African-American journalists at the Tribune, their evaluation of police passivity. Some lauded the hands-off
were engaged with the rioters in ways that the predominantly white approach as a strategic move to mitigate the potential for violence
police officers were not.
while others deemed it a lapse in police judgment.
The Tribune’s photographs that did depict officers captured
In addition to Police Commissioner Leary, who praised his
the fragility of the newspaper’s place within the landscape; like department for its restraint, Mayor Tate remained one of the
the dailies, the Tribune showed few images of police officers in most vocal supporters of police activity during the riot. Quoted
active positions. One photograph, “Irate Police Club Suspect into by the Philadelphia Inquirer as saying that had police used guns
Submission,” marked a stark departure from the visual tableaux. instead of nightsticks, the riot would have been a “bloodbath,” he
Depicting an officer with his nightstick poised to strike blows on proclaimed: “We weathered the storm and returned to normalcy
a rioter being held on the ground, the photograph displayed an without having to resort to horses, firehoses or firearms. And this
aggressive, perhaps even abusive, police force. According to the is an achievement of which all Philadelphians can be proud.”38
caption, the picture encapsulated why “residents of [the] area His commentary, referencing the recent tactics employed by
are not in love with law enforcement agencies.”35 Police action Birmingham, Alabama, Police Chief Bull Connor, revealed the
and assertiveness, according to the Tribune, were not necessarily mayor’s attempt to differentiate Philadelphia from other cities
good for police-community relations because they were one of which had sustained similar uprisings. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
the reasons that residents of North Philadelphia were wary of was not Philadelphia, Mississippi.39
police, leading local NAACP leader Cecil B. Moore to attribute
Tate’s praise of police restraint was not universally shared.
the violence on Columbia Avenue to “a long history of police Opposition emerged most vocally from two camps: the NAACP
mistreatment.”36
and the Philadelphia City Council. Despite overlapping critiques,
Except for this anomalous photograph of police action, the roots of their resistance lay in fundamentally different concerns.
photographs of police across the city’s newspapers told the same Speaking on behalf of the NAACP, Roy Wilkins articulated concern
visual story: a police department that did little to intervene as the that Philadelphia’s riot, like other urban riots in the North, was
violence grew more intense. The three photographs on the front part of a larger national conspiracy that the National Guard should
page of the Inquirer two days earlier captured the newspapers’ have been called in to address. His call for the National Guard,
collective framing of police intervention during the riot. The although not an explicit critique of police action, suggested that
largest photograph was captioned: “Storekeeper retrieved register Philadelphia’s police could not do the job. City Council President
from sidewalk outside shop wrecked during night of rioting and Paul D’Ortona agreed with Wilkins’ appeal for greater police
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C

ompounding the effects of news coverage indicating a
presence, arguing that Philadelphia needed to hire additional
passive and ineffectual police force, the editorial boards of
policemen to control the “hoodlums.” Where he diverged from
the four newspapers weighed in on the appropriateness of
Wilkins was in his more forceful claim for the entrenchment of
law that people should fear. According to the Inquirer, the city police work during the riot. Each acknowledged that police could
council president claimed, “[T]he enemies of the decent people of have done more to actively stop the violence and looting, and they
this city must know and fear the power of the law.”40 While news agreed that firing on looters could have touched off, in the words
organizations largely focused on the apparent disregard for the law of the Inquirer, “a holocaust of death.” Where they disagreed, like
by the rioters and the inability of the police department to restore their sources, was whether more police would have been a good
order, D’Ortona’s claim that the law was something people needed thing. For the Inquirer and the Bulletin, emphasis was placed, as
to fear rather than simply to respect marked a crucial shift in the the Inquirer noted, on the “breakdown of law and order” in a city
where “young thugs have become accustomed to controlling the
way “law and order” was conceived.
streets in their neighborhoods.”45 The
Journalists failed to overtly adopt
Daily News was more ambivalent, hailing
D’Ortona’s tone in pushing for more
“Compounding the effects
police for their work during the riot but
aggressiveness by the police, yet news
raising the question as to whether more
reports quoting disgruntled police
of news coverage indicating a
police were necessary. The Tribune, in
officers implicitly agreed with him.
contrast, maintained its support for
One Philadelphia highway patrolman
passive and ineffectual police
the police department and its leaders,
claimed, according to the Inquirer, “We
try to defend citizens and their property force, the editorial boards of the crediting them with restoring order to
a neighborhood that had dissolved into
and even our own men, yet we have
chaos.
nothing to help ourselves. We were
four newspapers weighed in
The division between the Inquirer
told not to interfere with the rioting or
the looting. We saw people looting the on the appropriateness of police and the Bulletin, on the one hand, and the
Daily News and the Tribune, on the other,
stores and we didn’t stop them.”41 The
work during the riot.
was placed into stark relief immediately
Inquirer similarly reported Deputy Police
the riot’s outbreak as the
Commissioner Frank Rizzo’s command
Each acknowledged that police following
papers editorialized on the violence. The
to his men not to “make a move if you’re
Inquirer’s August 30 editorial, “In North
outnumbered. Let them break the
could have done more
Philadelphia: A Tragedy,” reflected upon
windows.”42 Such statements advanced
the dominant critique that police officers to actively stop the violence and violence which, the paper noted, no
one, black or white, wanted. Within
remained virtually powerless to combat
days, however, the Inquirer’s tone was
violence and looting, presenting not only
looting, and they agreed that
less somber. The “shattered” pride of the
orders from such high-ranking officials
firing on looters could have
City of Brotherly Love that “must be
as Rizzo but frustrations from below.
built again”46 on August 30 was deemed
Officers claimed they were paralyzed,
touched
off,
in
the
words
a consequence of the “Deplorable and
constrained by the department’s chain of
Disgraceful” state of the city a day later.
command.
of the Inquirer,
The Inquirer pointedly stated, “The plain
The stories of local merchants
unhappy fact is that police cannot even
furthered the image of an undermanned
‘a holocaust of death.’”
exercise routine day-by-day control over
department unable to answer the calls of
street gangs in this city. How, then, are
those victimized by the riot. The Inquirer
chronicled the stories of two local merchants: Samuel Fox, a shoe riots to be quelled?” Noting that “many police not only conducted
storeowner, and Samuel Nerenblatt, a dry goods storeowner. Fox themselves admirably and heroically in this crisis,” the paper
complained, “I asked for protection and I was told not to worry. claimed police “showed a coolness of judgment under fire that was
The police seemed like they didn’t want to make trouble—so instrumental in preventing a terrible tragedy from becoming much
they just stood there.” A disgruntled Nerenblatt relayed a similar worse.” Its conclusion was nonetheless severe: “Police protection
experience with police after being told, “That’s tough” in response has declined dangerously in this city—a truth which this newspaper
to the his call to report the looting of his store. He said, “Isn’t there and numerous responsible citizens have been saying.” Thus, the
any law left? If I get stopped for speeding, can I tell the policeman paper’s challenge to the city was considerably more confrontational
than its lament a day earlier. Although this editorial made no
‘Forget it’?”43
While the Inquirer and Bulletin cited several examples of police explicit reference to the Police Advisory Board, claims about the
officers claiming their hands were tied by the departmental chain city’s “decline in police protection,” 47 which was represented by the
of command, Police Commissioner Leary denied accusations paper and its counterparts in photographs and written text, would
that he ordered police officers not to use their guns. Seeking to resurface in debates surrounding the board’s viability.
The tone of the Inquirer’s commentary grew stronger over the
set the record straight, he stated, “The Philadelphia police force
does not use violent methods except when required to avoid next several days. Following its declaration of the laxity of police
imminent injury or death to either police officers or civilians.”44 protection, the editorial board clarified its critique of a city that was
His comment, attempting to portray his department as defensive unprepared: “Beyond any question, the riots in North Philadelphia
rather than offensive, only reinforced arguments that police have demonstrated an urgent and critical need for better protection
officers were kept from using their guns, although this was not of the law-abiding citizens of this city against hoodlums.” Charging
police with not “safeguard[ing] property,” the Inquirer continued,
the case.
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“Property could have been protected, and looting prevented, if
police had been on the scene earlier, in larger numbers, properly
equipped, with an advance plan of action, and with leadership
prepared to execute the plan.”48 The culmination of four days
of opining about the police in the city, this editorial showed the
paper had changed its view considerably from its initial positive
evaluation of police work during the riot.
While the Bulletin editorial board’s tone never rivaled the
Inquirer’s in intensity, the paper’s evaluation of police action during
the riot was similarly disapproving. On August 31, it stated:
Two great losses remain to be reckoned. . . . One lies in the
visible breakdown of law-enforcement, which permitted the looting
of some 220 stores under the very eyes of the police. The long-range
effects of such a display of disrespect for the law can only be harmful
in the extreme. . . . A second great loss, still to be counted, lies in the
incalculable damage to the sustained effort in Philadelphia to create an
understanding relationship between the races.49

The Bulletin’s ordering of the “two great losses” reflected its
primary concern with perceptions of police inaction. However,
the reference to the police department “permit[ting]” rioters to
loot stores revealed more than the paper’s disapproval of the way
police that exerted their authority. The Bulletin perceived police
action to reflect a broader trend toward disrespect in the city, which
wielded “long-range effects.” Cast in this way, the riot signaled
short-term destruction and the potential for future disaster rooted
in racial divisions. The paper’s tone may not have been as overtly
aggressive as the Inquirer’s, but it left readers with a similar degree
of uncertainty regarding the future safety of their city.
The Daily News remained considerably less outspoken about
the riot, but one week following its end it printed a summary
statement: “This newspaper believes the Police Department deserves
the praise that has been heaped on it from many quarters for its
conduct during the recent riot in North Philadelphia. Despite great
provocation, police kept their heads and refrained from actions
that could have precipitated a bloodbath.”50 In spite of the damages
in the neighborhood, the work of police was ultimately worthy of
praise and admiration. Unlike the other dailies, however, the Daily
News debated whether hiring 1,000 additional policemen, which
was proposed by Mayor Tate following the riot, was necessary. It
conceded that, “additional manpower, available in a hurry, might
have prevented some, if not all of the looting,” but the paper did
not stand by the statement wholeheartedly. Concluding on a
more pragmatic note, the editorial board stated, “The taxpayers of
Philadelphia will want to be convinced that the additional police
are really needed.”51 Thus, the Daily News was more apprehensive
about weighing in on the necessity of more police than its
counterparts.
Closest to the Daily News in its commentary, the Tribune was
the only unwavering supporter of Commissioner Leary, Mayor
Tate, and the Philadelphia Police Department. Its editorial, like
those in the Bulletin and Inquirer, invoked “law and order” and the
need for its maintenance. Unlike the dailies, however, the Tribune
persisted in its praise of the police department’s restraint in dealing
with the violence in North Philadelphia. There was a difference
between advocating respect for law and order and supporting
greater police power. This differential interpretation of “law
and order” lay at the root of the variations in coverage between
Philadelphia’s newspapers. Embedded within the phrase “law and
order” used by the city’s dailies was a racial implication: the need to
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exert authority over the lawless black “hoodlums,” who disrupted
order within the city. The Tribune did not dispute the need to keep
the peace, yet greater police power, in its estimation, would only
lead to greater divisiveness.

L

ess than two weeks after the riot, coverage subsided, and
the editorial boards quieted. While the focus turned to
how the city would cope with the financial burden of
having to rebuild the North Philadelphia neighborhood where
the damages had occurred, with occasional overtures to the socalled “ringleaders” of the riot, the discussion surrounding the
relationship between Philadelphia’s Police Advisory Board and the
nature of police response to the outbreak of violence on Columbia
Avenue had only just begun.
The Police Advisory Board and the Police Department, from
the former’s inception in 1958, had hardly maintained civil
relations. The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) filed a petition for
a preliminary injunction against the city and the Police Review
Board in December 1959, about one year after Mayor Dilworth
had established the advisory body, charging he lacked the power to
establish such a board. The board received additional attention from
organizations such as the Fraternal Order of Police because of the
suspected impact the board would have upon police work. In 1962,
the Pennsylvania Guardian, a pro-police publication, commented,
“Why the FOP dislikes the PAB is easy to understand. The FOP is
to policemen what the American Legion is to veterans. As such it’s
big for law, order, and nightsticks. And anyone against nightsticks
is against law, order, and the FOP.”52 The Guardian’s linkage of
law, order, and police weapons highlighted precisely what police
criticized the board for depriving policemen of in 1964: the ability
to exert their authority.
The argument that the Police Advisory Board kept officers
from effectively carrying out the duties of police work was one of
the two central arguments leveled against the board by political
officials and law enforcement. The other dealt with police morale:
the board was created as a punitive body that would highlight
the weaknesses of the police department and thereby contribute
negatively to the tenor of the police establishment. Statistics
proved the contrary. Between October 1958 and August 1963,
the Police Advisory Board received 411 complaints about police
brutality, illegal arrest or search, harassment, and “other” offenses.
Of these complaints, half were withdrawn, closed, settled without a
hearing, or dismissed due to the non-appearance of a complainant.
Suspensions or reprimands were recommended in only thirty-one
of the cases.53
Although the board seemed to reinforce the achievements
rather than emphasize the flaws of the Philadelphia Police
Department, the criticisms leveled against it did not dissipate.
The FOP continued its quest to demonstrate and reflect upon
the “failures” of the board, and the 1964 Columbia Avenue riot
presented such an opportunity because the outbreak of violence in
Philadelphia raised questions not only in Philadelphia but also in
New York City, which was looking to Philadelphia as an exemplar.
New York Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy announced
in October 1964, months after the Columbia Avenue riot, that
“a board of second-guessers” would undermine police morale and
discipline. He stated, “Weaken the police and you weaken the
entire structure of government. Demoralize the police department
and you destroy law and order.” A staunch critic of New York
City’s board, he believed “false charges of police brutality often are
used as an excuse for riots.”54 Evoking memories in the not-too117

distant past of Philadelphia’s riot and Harlem’s before it, which had satisfied” with the ways the violence was handled,59 in October
begun in predominantly African-American neighborhoods where 1966 he stated, “Ten square miles of businesses in Philadelphia
a seemingly minor disturbance sparked a melee, he argued police were wiped out during the 1964 riots because that city had a
advisory boards kept police from actively doing their jobs.
civilian-staffed police complaint board.”60 The statement marked
The conversation between leaders in Philadelphia and New York a staggering shift in content and tone from those during the riot,
City continued in May 1965 when John Samuels of the New York reflecting the increasing pressure by law and order advocates
Democratic Club asked Police Advisory Board Executive Director outside the city as well as in it.
Mercer Tate if he believed the board lowered police morale. Tate’s
Harrington’s controversial claim that the board caused the
response unsurprisingly was no. However, he conceded, “I think it destruction of the North Philadelphia neighborhood spawned
is fair to say that policemen have been more careful in engaging in a variety of reactions and attempts to set the record straight.
bodily contact in furtherance of their duties (and in exceeding their Maurice Fagan, the chairman of the Philadelphia Fellowship
duties) as the result of the establishment
Commission, argued that Harrington’s
and operation of our Board. This was,
statement was patently untrue. In a letter
I think, particularly evident during
to Philadelphia Managing Director Fred
“Although the delegitimation
the North Philadelphia racial riots last
Corleto, he wrote: “I spoke today with
summer.”55 Such a comment, while
Howard Leary about the statement, and
of the rioters enabled news
meant to highlight the board’s positive
he says there is absolutely no foundation
organizations to dismiss
impact upon the Philadelphia Police
to it and under no circumstances, would
Department, played well into the hands
he had tolerated any police officer
the violence as unrelated to the refusing to do his duty for this or any
of the board’s detractors.
Several months after Mercer Tate’s
other reason.”61 Board Executive Director
efforts
of
civil
rights
leaders
exchange with Samuels, as the one-year
Mercer Tate took on the mantle of
anniversary of the Columbia Avenue
refuting Harrington by writing a letter to
and, by extension, to racial
riot approached, James Williams of
the Philadelphia Inquirer, the newspaper
Philadelphia’s Congress of Racial
which had first printed Harrington’s
strife, the marginalization
Equality wrote a letter to Mayor James
statement. He claimed:
Tate, expressing concern regarding
of the rioters simultaneously
The statement that ten square miles
North Philadelphia. Citing heightened
of businesses were wiped out in the 1964
reified the broader language
racial tensions, he pleaded for Mayor
Philadelphia riots is untrue. The businesses
Tate to recognize the true potential of the
Police Advisory Board, which according used to describe a neighborhood which were damaged were isolated and
such damage in no way occurred because of
to Williams, was an institution that “has
the existence of the Police Advisory Board.
known
commonly
not been given a chance or [the] support
Police were neither “confused” nor “afraid to
to really become an asset.” He attributed
as ‘The Jungle.’ The ‘shouting, use nightsticks or blackjacks” nor were they
the board’s lack of success to “city
promised by any city official that they would
officials’ reluctance to fight the bigots
howling’ members of the North not be taken before the Police Advisory Board
and the far right over the concept of such
as a result of actions taken during the riot
period.62
Philadelphia community
a Board.”56 Tate’s response on August 23,
1965, reassured Williams that the Police
Tate’s attempt to make clear the real
Advisory Board had his support, which described by news organizations
“effects” of the Police Advisory Board was
“has been consistent despite pressures by
were envisaged as part
evident. He argued that the board did
the Fraternal Order of Police and bigoted
not tie the hands of officers, and it did
organizations like the John Birch Society
of an unruly mob unaware
not cause police officers to be paralyzed
to weaken or destroy it.”57 The Police
Advisory Board, for local black leaders
of its actions and in desperate in the line of duty.
Tate’s words did little good. By
and the mayor, wielded the potential
March
1967, the language of the
to ease racial tensions by fostering trust
need of policing.”
board’s detractors had taken hold, and
between the police and the Africanthe executive order creating the Police
American community.
Mayor Tate remained steadfast in his conviction that the board Advisory Board was deemed in violation of Philadelphia’s Home
was a pivotal part of civilian oversight of the police department, Rule Charter.63 Consequently, the board was prohibited from
although he increasingly became the voice of dissent as opponents listening to additional cases.64 In response, Mercer Tate wrote to
of the board became more vocal in their critiques both inside the mayor, “I feel it is a great tragedy that your Police Advisory
the city as well as across the nation. The Town Crier, a monthly Board is languishing while police-community relations are rapidly
newsletter published by the Philadelphia Committee to Support worsening. This is a national problem.”65 And languish the board
Your Local Police, reported in January 1966 that “our nation’s did, despite pleas from local news organizations, including the
chief law enforcement officer, J. Edgar Hoover has stated, ‘A Police Bulletin, and Advisory Board advocates.66
On December 22, 1969, the Philadelphia Police Department
Advisory Board constitutes a backward step in law enforcement.’”58
Echoing Hoover’s critique, FOP President John J. Harrington took received, in the words of Police Commissioner Rizzo, the greatest
the claim one step further by bringing it back to Philadelphia. Christmas present it could have asked for: the Philadelphia Police
Despite his statement during the riots that he was “perfectly Advisory Board was dissolved. Mayor Tate claimed the Police
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Advisory Board “did not measure up to the Police Department’s
own Board of Inquiry, and that, at best, its activities and
procedures were negative.”67 A stunning pronouncement from one
of the board’s most avid supporters throughout the 1960s, Mayor
Tate’s press release revealed the extent to which the climate of the
city had changed since the election of Cold War liberals Joseph
Clark and Dilworth to the mayor’s office in the 1950s. A year and
a half prior to Tate’s announcement of the board’s dissolution,
President Johnson’s Kerner Commission provided hard evidence
for the necessity of institutional infrastructures aimed at easing
racial tensions in urban areas. The federal commission championed
bodies such as police advisory boards as advocates of all people,
black and white. Philadelphia, however, did not heed the words
of the commission. Still reigning was the “bitter residue of fear”
of cities dissolving into chaos at the hands of black radicals and
of police unable to contain the violence, which was cited by the
commission.68
News coverage of Philadelphia’s 1964 riots did not lead alone
to the Police Advisory Board’s demise. As the debates surrounding
the board’s viability reveal, pressures exerted from within as well as
outside city limits by pro-law enforcement agencies were exerted on
Mayor Tate, political officials, and the courts. Yet, news coverage
of Philadelphia’s 1964 riot on Columbia Avenue, privileging the
frames of marginalization and police paralysis, offered more than
an interpretive lens through which to view the eruption of violence.
In encouraging readers to understand the riot as a war between the
city and black “hoodlums” whose disregard for law and order was
enabled by an ill-equipped police department, news organizations
provided a language that could be co-opted by political interests to
advance the agenda of law and order conservatives. The simplicity
of news frames enabled the circulating discourse to focus on police
power rather than on the larger, structural problems confronting
the predominantly black neighborhood, problems only alluded
to briefly by Philadelphia’s black press. Emphasizing the rioters’
marginal status, news organizations characterized the young men
and women of the community in which the riot broke out as
outside any legitimate movement. They were “acting out” rather
than exercising a legitimate grievance, according to the newspapers.
Although the delegitimation of the rioters enabled news
organizations to dismiss the violence as unrelated to the efforts
of civil rights leaders and, by extension, to racial strife, the
marginalization of the rioters simultaneously reified the broader
language used to describe a neighborhood known commonly as
“The Jungle.” The “shouting, howling” members of the North
Philadelphia community described by news organizations were
envisaged as part of an unruly mob unaware of its actions and in
desperate need of policing. When police were needed in the case
of the 1964 North Philadelphia riot, they held back, reluctant to
use their weapons to restore order, and subsequently were cast as
weak and ineffectual actors in stemming the violence. Agreeing to
the substance but not the spirit of the Inquirer’s and the Bulletin’s
coverage, the Tribune, and the Daily News to a lesser extent,
remained the voices of dissent, praising police action during the riot.
Like Mayor Tate, newspapers articulated concern that additional
lives would have been lost in a neighborhood “bloodbath” if police
used guns. Yet, the papers disagreed about alternatives.
When news coverage first emerged in the wake of the
spontaneous violence that erupted on August 28, no mention was
made of the potential impact of the Police Advisory Board upon
police action. Within months, however, as debates surrounding the
necessity of such advisory bodies flared not only in Philadelphia
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but also in New York City, coverage of Philadelphia’s riot seemed
to provide much needed evidence for the Fraternal Order of
Police and other board detractors that police power would be
restrained when law enforcement was compelled to carefully
consider the ramifications of its actions. Restraint, for the board’s
opponents, signaled a weakness: deference to the rioters wreaking
havoc in Philadelphia. Yet this restraint, which this study refers
to as a frame of police paralysis, became evidence of not simply
police reluctance to use force but of the liberal “permissiveness”
against which a growing conservative movement was reacting.69
Journalistic discourses were co-opted in the service of ends that
news organizations had not anticipated.

Y

ears after the riot on Columbia Avenue ended, the frames
of marginalization and police paralysis had not disappeared.
They served as potent reminders of what could happen if
police decided to “stand by” while lawless black “hoodlums” ruled
the streets. Although journalists had not covered the riots with the
intention of shaping the board’s fate, the coverage was ultimately
used for ends that they had not envisioned, bolstering the claims
of law and order advocates. In the wake of rioting in Watts in Los
Angeles in 1965, and in Detroit and Newark two summers later,
where violence had begun under conditions mirroring those in
North Philadelphia, the city stood at a crossroads. Philadelphia
could either internalize the messages of the Kerner Commission,
encouraging racial unity through institutional change, or yield
to the pressure of conservatives. Choosing the latter course,
Philadelphia embarked on a rightward political turn that deepened
the existing racial schism as it sought to define itself against the
lingering frames of marginalization and police paralysis. Thus,
Philadelphia stayed the course that the Kerner Commission
observed as defining urban America: “two societies, one black, one
white—separate and unequal.”70
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